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THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE STATE.
It has been a matter of observation, and of some concern,
among thoughtful men in this country who have attended to
the evolution of constitutional doctrine as declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, that that body has perhaps,
in a few respects, unwisely expanded Federal power. For example, the view is held not only by strict constructionists, but
by many who are in sympathy with the doctrine of a broad
nationality, that the Court has erred in establishing as its law
that the Federal Courts are not bound by the decisions of the
courts of the State where they happen to be sitting, on matters.
of general commercial law, and other subjects not involving a.
construction of the Federal Constitution, statutes and treaties.
The harmony of our two systems of government, State and
National, would seem to require, not only that the State Courts
should be permitted to construe their own Constitutions and
statutes, but that the principles of general law established by
them, should be obligatory upon the Federal Courts administering law in the several States and taking jurisdiction solely
on the ground of citizenship. The establishment of a Federal
commercial law is conceived to be an excrescence on the Federal system. The extension of Congressional power, by late
decisions of the Supreme Court, has also been the subject of
some animadversion. When the second series of Legal Tender
Cases were decided (1870), 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 457, it was
charged that the Court was packed by President Grant, for the
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.special purpose of securing the desired judgment. The decision in this series of cases is now deemed sound by many who
withhold their assent to the doctrine of the latest Legal Tender
Case : Juilliardv. Greenman (1883), 110 U. S. 421, which declared that Congress may, in time of peace, and not strictly as
-a war measure, make treasury notes a legal tender.
I Because of these, and perhaps a few other doubtful extensions of the power of the Federal Courts and the National
-Congress, some thinkers of an atrabilious tendency have
worked themselves into the uncomfortable frame of mind of
supposing that our great Court of last resort is chiefly occti;pied in a conspiracy against local self-government, as a prin.ciple of American law, and against the States, as organs of the
,expression of that principle.
In order to guard against such careless judgments, it is useful for the profession; holding, as it does, the Supreme Court
in high esteem, not only as our chief protector of National interests, but also as the great conservator of State rights within
the Constitution, occasionally to reflect upon the facts of the
limitations upon Federal power that have been established by
that body. It is proposed in this article to show, by a few illustrations of the evolution of the law of one of the great
National powers-the commerce power-that the Court has
maintained, and has indeed advanced upon itself in maintaining, the limitations of the Constitution as they relate to State
functions of government.
The development of the Constitution, during a century of
interpretation by the Supreme Court, is believed to have been
mainly a natural and healthy growth, fully within the lines
marked by those who framed it. If its words have expanded
with the years, so as to give room for the growing Nation, it
is conceived, generally speaking, that it is not because the Supreme Court has been false to its trust in interpreting them,
but rather that it has been true and loyal to the purpose of its
creation, in permitting them to have the full significance they
were intended to possess. When the capacity of the words
the statesmen of 1787 fixed in the Federal Constitution, comes
to its final measure in the coming time, many believe that it
will be among their best titles to renown that they framed an
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instrument as potential of good in the hands of just interpreters in the future, as it was sufficient for the miore immediate
objects of its creators when it was first called into being.
The commerce clause of the first article of the Constitution,
giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and with the Indian
tribes, has, perhaps, more than' any one grant of power in our
fundamental law, helped to make us the Nation we to-day are.
But they read the history of the formation of the Constitution
wrong, if they read it at all, who assert that it was not the
deliberate purpose of those who inserted it in the Constitution,
to make it contribute in the way it has to the National growth.
Hamilton and Madison and Wilson intended to.make a Nation,
as well as to construct an instrument of government. It is
well known that the want of the power in the old Confederation to regulate commerce, assisted materially in bringing
about the formation and adoption of the Constitution. The
commerce clause was adopted by the Philadelphia Convention
with unanimity and almost without debate, saving the portion
of it relating to the Indian tribes. Immediately upon its adoption by the people, the petty restrictions on interstate trade
that some States had established under the Confederation, gave
way to unfettered freedom of intercourse. The unavailing,
because ununited, efforts of the several Legislatures to develop
American commerce, were abandoned for efficient Congressional action that gave the sea to our ships and gave ships to
the sea. American vessels found the same anchorage in European ports that foreign ships were accorded here. He would
have been a dull observer and a feeble patriot who failed to
see and to welcome the new commercial order. All this was
early fruit. The growing years have since brought into view
the larger purpose of those who, while seeking an immediate
good, were mindful of future needs-While building a structure
for the day, were erecting for all time.
It has been remarked by jurists that the onstitutional law
of the commerce clause to-day, is practically the constitutional
law of the first commerce case that came before the Supreme
Court. Said Justice LAMAR, in Kidd v. Pearson (I888), 128
U. S. I, 16-

736

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE STATE.

"The line which separates the province of Federal authority over the regulation
of commerce, from the powers reserved to the States, has engagedthe attention of
this Court in a great number and variety of cases. The decisions in these cases,
though they do not in a single instance assume to trace that line throughout its entire extent, or to state any rule further than to locate the line in each particular
case as it arises, have almost uniformly adhered to the fundamental principles
which Chief Justice MARSHALL, ia the case of Gibbonrv. Ogden (x824), 9 Wheat.
(22 U. S.) x, laid down as to the nature ad extent of the grant of power to Congress on this subject, and also of the limitations, express and implied, which it imposes upon State legislation with regard to taxation, to the control of domestic
commerce, and to all persons and things within its limits, of purely internal concern.1

The truth is, however, that practically there has been both
an expansion and a limitation in respect of Federal commercial power-am expansion or enlargement of the subjects of
the exercise of the power, a limitation or clear marking ofthe
lines within which it is exercisable There has been no expansion of doctrine as to the scope of the grant of power; but a
very necessary enlargement of occasion for its exercise.
When it was decided in 1877 in Pensacola Tegrapk Co. v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. i, that the Western
Union Telegraph Company, having accepted the Act of Congress of I866, could not be excluded by the Legislature of
that State from doing business in Florida, it perhaps seemed
to some a great advance on the doctrine of Gibbons v. Ogden,
that the State of New York could not, by the grant of an
exclusive franchise to one person, to navigate with boats
moved by fire or steam all the waters within the jurisdiction
of the State, deprive another person possessed of the right to
carry on the coasting trade, from running steamboats between
Elizabethtown in New Jersey and New York. It was merely,
however, declaring that the telegraph, as well as the steamboat, was an instrument of interstate commerce. The power
in Congress to construct interstate and transcontinental railway lines, considered in Calfornia v. CentralPacific Railroad
Co. (1887), 127 U. S. I, as well settled, and the power to pass
such comprehensive legislation as the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887, regulating the management of the interstate
railways of the United States, were vast additions of power to
that enjoyed by the first Congress, only because the railway
had joined the steamboat as an .instrument of commerce, and

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE STATE.

,because the small territory of the infant republic of thirteen
struggling States had grown to the imperial domain of a Nation of thirty-eight.
A large share of the evolution, if not alteration, of judicial
opinion, as to the scope of the commerce clause, that is to be
seen in its development thus far, is due to the ripening of
thought on the subject of its limitations.
No better illustration of this is to be found than-in, what
might be called, the histology, and the subsequent history of
the modern doctrine as to the exclusiveness of the power in
Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.
"In the complex system of polity which prevails in this country," said Mr. Justice SWAYNE, speaking for the Court in Expare Mfc-'eil (I87), 13 Wall. (80 U.
S.) 236, 24o, "the powers of government may be divided into four classes: Those
which belong exclusively to the States; those which belong exclusively to the
'National Government; those which may be exercised concurrently and independ,ently by both; those which may be exercised by the States, but only until Congress shall see fit to act upon the subject. The authority of the State then retires,
and lies in abeyance, until the occasion for its exercise shall recur."

At least three views have been promulgated as to the extent
of the commerce power. They may for convenience be termed
the earlier view, the later and maturer view, and the views of
Mr. Justice DANIEL.
The reasoning of the great Chief Justice, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, clearly points towards the broad and simple rule early
laid down and adopted by some of the judges, if not by the
majority of the Court, that the very grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce, ipsofacto excludes all control over
it by the States. Said the Court in its opinion in that case, p.
209"It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant that as the word ' to
regulate' implies in its nature full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes,
necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the
same thing. That regulation is designed for the entire result, applying to those
parts which remain as they were, as well as to those which are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as much disturbed and.deranged by changing
what the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that on which it has op,erated. - There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that
it has been refuted."

The case was in fact decided on the ground that Congress
had regulated the particular subject matter under considera-
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tion, and that therefore State regulation of it was impossible..
But the argument sanctioned by the Court. would lead to the
conclusion that, whether Congress had acted or not, the States
could not exercise power. Indeed justice JOHNSON, in a separate opinion, distinctly affirmed and applied this doctrine to
the case.
This position was maintained by Justice STORY in his dissenting opinion in New York v. Miln (1837), Ii Pet. ( 3 6U.'S.)
io2, in which he stated that he had the concurrence of Chief

Justice

MARSHALL.

Justice

BALDWIN

in his dissenting opinion

in Groves v. Slaughter (1841), i5 Pet. (40 U. S.) 449, 5"1,
Justice MCLEAN in the License Cases (1847), 5 How. (46 U. S.)
5o4, the same Justice and Justices WAYNE and McKIn.NL in
The PassengerCases (1849), 7 How. (48 U. S.) 283, and Justices
McLEAN and WAYNE in Cooley v. Board of Wardens(I85), 12
How. (53 U. S.) 299, held this view.
The Court was without cohesion on constitutional questions, after the death of Chief Justice MARSHALL in 1835. His
vigorous personality seems almost uniformly to have moulded
its opinions during his lifetime. During, what might be called,
the era of individual views, which began with the case of New
York v. Miln, in 1837, and continued for a score of years, the
doctrine of the exclusiveness of power in Congress was the
subject of very earnest and even acrid discussion among the
members of the Court. Every case was a battle ground.
The views of the individual. judges were so diverse, that in
some cases each judge wrote his own opinion, and no opinion
of the Court was possible. In the Lienxse Cases, six judges
wrote nine opinions. In the Passenger Cases, there were
eight opinions.
In New York v. Mtdn, justice THOMPSON declared that the
power was not exclusive in Congress, but that State regulation
was possible, unless Congress had acted on the particular subject in such a way as to antagonize the State law. In the License Cases Chief Justice TANEY and Justices CATRON, NELSON
and WOODBURY, and in the PassengerCases the Chief Justice
and Justices NELSON and WOODBURY supported this view,
Justice DANIEL in the latter case asserting it, and going much
farther, as will be seen.
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Justice DANIEL was infused with the doctrine of State sovereignty in its old sense. He magnified the State, he minified
the Nation. In the PassengerCases, he whittled down the word
commerce to the smallest possible dimensions, making it equivalent to trade and navigation, and denying that it extended to
intercourse, as established in Gibbons v. Ogden. In his conception, the grant of inter-State and foreign commerce power
to Congress, was not only not exclusive, but was neither large
nor comprehensive. A large residuum of such power was
left in the States, to be exercised not merely if Congress had
not interfered or should not interfere, but to be enjoyed to the
exclusion of Congressional action in certain ways. In the
Passenger Cases, he contended that the right of the State to
admit foreigners upon its own terms, or to exclude them altogether, was purely a subject of State law. In Cooley v. Board
o Wardens, he affirmed that the power to enact pilot laws,
which were agreed to be regulations of commerce, was not
within the terms of the grant to Congress, was an original and
inherent power in the States, and was not one to be merely
tolerated by or held subject to the sanction of the Federal Government. The opinions of Justice DANIEL are all vigorous and
even profound, but the chief characteristic of his views, as related to the development of the law of the commerce clause,
is their eccentricity. They contributed in no respect to the
advancement of opinion, and do not seem to have been shared
by other members of the Court. Their interest to-day is
purely historical. The earnest and repeated objections expressed by some of the members of the Court, to the rigid
doctrine of absolute exclusiveness of power in Congress, over
commerce with foreign nations and among the States, brought
about a re-statement of the law. The advocates of the nonexclusive theory practically had a majority as early as 1847,
when the License Cases were decided. Four of the Justices,
as already mentioned there, formally adopted it, and although
Mr. Justice DANIEL then expressed no opinion on the subject,
he believed wholly with the Chief Justice and Justices CATRON,
NELSON and WOODBURY.

The non-exclusive theory, as stated at that time, is well ex-
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-pressed by Chief Justice
.How. (46 U. S.) 504, 578.

in the License Cases (1847), 5
He said-

TANEY

-" It is well known that, upon this subject, a difference of opinion has existed, and
-sfil exists, among the members of this Court. But, with every respect for the .
opifion of my brethren with whom I do not agree, it appears to me to be very clear
that the mere grant of power to the General Government can not, upon any just
principles of construction, be construed to be an absolute prohibition to the exercise
S:any power over the same subject by the States. The controlling and supreme
.power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, is undoubtedly conferred upon Congress. Yet, in my judgment, the State may nevertheless, for the safety or convenience of trade, or for the protection of the health of
its citizens, make regulations of commerce for its own ports and harbors and for iis
-own territory; and such regulations are valid unless they come in conflict with a
law of Congress."

The modem doctrine was first distinctly formulated and
:adopted by the Court in 1851, in Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. (53 U. S.) 299, 319. Said Mr. justice CURTIS,
speaking for himself and Chief Justice TANEY, and Justices
CATRON, McKINLEY, NELSON and GRIER, who composed the

majority of the Court"The power to regulate commerce embraces a vast field, containing not only
'many, but exceedingly various subjects, unlike in their nature; some imperatively
.demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United
.States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question [pilotage], as imperatively demanding that diversity which alone can meet the local necessities of
anavigation. Either absolutely to affirm or deny that the nature of this power
.requires exclusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert, concerning all of them, what is really applicable
:bt to a parL Whatever sujctrs of this Aower are in their nature Natioal,ar
.admtit only of one uiform system or plan of regulation, mayjust be saidto be of
-such a nature as to require exclusive legislationby Congress."
The counterpart of the rule was not definitely formulated
*-till i865, when Justice SWAYNE, speaking for the Court in Gil.?=X V. Ph3ladelphia, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 713, 726, said that to
-theextent that the subjects require rules and provisions sug-.
:gestid by the varying circumstances *ofdifferent localities, and
'limited in 'their operation to such localities respectively, the
.power to regulate commerce may be exercised by the States.':
There was no absolute unanimity in the Court on this subject until much later. In Cooley v. Boardof Warders,Justicer.
McLEAN abd WAYNz expressly dissented adhering to the old
doctrine, and in Gilman v. Philadelphia,Justices CLIFFORD,
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and DAVIS dissented from the opinion on other grounds,
but so as to weaken the force of the views as expressed by the
majority. As late as 1872, it was asserted by the Court that
it had "never yet been decided by this Court that the power
to regulate interstate, as well as foreign, commerce, is not exclusively in Congress :" Case of the State Freig-ht Tax, 15 Wall.
(82 U.S.) 232, 279. It was not till 1875 that the whole Court
united in the adoption of the modern rule. The case was
Welton v. State of Alissouri,91 U.S. 275. The Court was then
composed of Chief Justice WAITE, and Justices CLIFFORD,
HUNT, STRONG, BRADLEY, SWAYNE, DAVIS, MILLER and FIELD.
Mr. Justice FIELD defined the scope and limitations of the
grant in the commerce clause, in terms which have been only
slightly modified since. He said, at pp. 279, 280--

WAYNE

"The power to regulate conferred by that clause upon Congress, is one without
limitation; and to regulate commerce is to prescribe rules by which it shall be
governed-that is, the conditions upon which it shall be conducted; to determine
how far it shall be free and untrammeled, how far it shall be hindered by duties
and imports, and how far it shall be prohibted. Commerce is a term of the largest
import. It comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any and all its
forms, including the transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities
between the citizens of one country and the citizens or subjects of other countries,
and between the citizens of different States. The power to regulate it, embraces
all the instruments by which such commerce may be conducted. So far as some
of those instruments are concerned, and some subjects which are local in theiroperation, it has been held that the State may provide regulations until Congress acts with
reference to them; but where the subject to whick the power applies is National
in its character, or of such a nature as to admit of uniformity of regulation, the
power is exclusive of all State authority."

The only extension which is needed to this language, to
make it absolutely full and comprehensive, is in the enlargement of the subjects included in the meaning of the word
commerce as above defined, so as to embrace persons as well as
commodities, traffic as well as intercourse, and covering navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, and also the ihstruments auxiliary to these and directly
connected therewith. Such late cases as County of Mobile v.
Kimball (I88O), 102 U. S. 691 ; Webber v. Virginia (1880), 103
Id. 344; Transportation Company v. Parkersbiirg(1882), 107
Id. 691; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago (1882), 1O7 Id. 678; and
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recognize this extension of meaning.
The modem doctrine, limiting the exclusiveness of the grant
in the Constitution, to subjects of a national character, is the
crystallization into a rule, of the wide national powers recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden, and the necessary State powers
over matters affecting commerce, affirmed in Wilson v. TheBlack
Bird Creek Marsk Co. (1829), 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 245. The harmonious working of the governments, State and National, it is
now seen, required the more plastic rule at present current.
The fact that this doctrine is the outcome by logical deduction
from early cases as now understood, does not the less give it
the effect of a progressive limitation, so far as the Supreme
Court is concerned. For the doctrine will always be placed
for comparison, by the side of the view once held and enforced
by SToRY and MARSAIs, that the exclusiveness of the power
in Congress was subject to no qualification whatever.
With what faithfulness, in working out the modem rule, the
Supreme Court has remained true to the Constitution as it was
intended to be, is shown by a passage in the Federalist In
the thirty-second paper of that collection, Hamilton saidBrown v. -Houston (1884), 114 Id. 623

"This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty, would
only exist in three cases; where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the
Union, and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and
where it granted an authority to the Union, to which a similarauthority in the
States would be a6solutelyand totally contradictoryandrefugnant."

Another illustration of the clarification of thought, if not
actual modification of opinion, as to the limitation of Federal
power in favor of the States, is seen in the recognition of State
power over the highways of interstate commerce, wholly within
the borders of a State. When it was laid down in Gibbos v.
Ogden, that the power in Congress to regulate interstate and
foreign commerce did not stop at the jurisdictional or external
boundaries of the States, but penetrated throughout their extent,
a very necessary principle was established, without which the
grant to Congress would have been of trifling value. But it
would have been very easy to advance from this position, which
carried with it the potential control by the United States of
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the avenues of interstate commerce within the States, to the
denial of actual control by the States of such avenues in the
absence of Congressional action. For a time, it seemed as if
the Court, by a liberality of interpretation of Federal statutes,
was about to deny to the States this control. In the great
Wheeling Bridge case (185 i), 13 How. (54 U. S.) 518, the Court
declared the erection of a bridge across the Ohio River, wholly
within the State of Virginia and erected under authority of that
State, a nuisance, and required its abatement. This was done,
it is true, not because the State, in the absence of Congressional
action, was in theory considered as without power to authorize
the structure as built, but because Congress had in fact legislated in such a way as to the free navigation of the Ohio River,
that the State legislation affecting such navigation was invalid.
The specific Congressional action upon which the majority of
the Court relied in their opinion, was, that ports of entry had
been established above the bridge, vessels had been licensed to
sail upon the river, duties had been imposed upon the officers
of vessels, and a compact for the free navigation of the river
entered into between Virginia and Kentucky, had been sanctioned at the time of the admission of the former State into the
Union.
It is only necessary to point out that if such general Congressional action had been maintained by the Court, through
later years, as sufficient of a regulation of the specific subject
to oust State action in the premises, comparatively little power
would remain in the States to-day over even their purely
internal commerce, connected as the avenues of such commerce
are, with those leading to other States. In the natural and
legitimate growth of the States during the last twenty-five
years, bridges have been built below Federal ports of entry,
totally cutting off access by sailing vessels to points above
them; vessels of the United States enjoying coasting and river
licenses have been prevented from sailing to such points, and
the free navigation of streams having outlets to other States
and to foreign ports, has not been maintained, as such "free
navigation" was defined in the Wheeling Bridge case. Much
of this has been done without Federal authority, and to the
great advantage of the people of the States and the strength-
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ening of their several governments. It has been so done because the Supreme Court, in the evolution of its thought, has
established better and broader doctrines as to State control
over the avenues of commerce, than those laid down by Justice
MCLEAN in the Wheeling Bridge case.
In the Chestnut Street Bridge case, Gilman v. Philadephia
(1865), 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 715, the Court, practically receding
from the postulates of the Whkeeling Bridge case to that extent,
declared that general Congressional action establishing a port
of entry above the site of a proposed bridge on the Schuylkill
River, and the licensing of vessels to carry on the coasting
trade to and from the port, was not sufficient legislation on the
subject to negative the right of the State to authorize the erection of the bridge, although the bridge when built would prevent all access of the licensed vessels to points above it. The
majority of the Court properly considered the State as entitled
to control its own avenues of commerce, and with a prescient,
practical sense, refused to limit the State in establishing new
avenues of land as well as water communication within its
borders, so long as Congress had not limited it either by
specific laws or by a definite policy of action. Had the State
of Pennsylvania been declared incompetent to bridge the
Schuylkill at West Philadelphia, because a few vessels of National register had previously been accustomed to drop their
anchors higher up the stream, a large part of the legitimate
State powers of internal improvement would, from that time,
have been given over to Congress, to the very great detriment,
as we must believe, of the public interest The development
of land communication by rail and road, necessitating the
crossing of streams and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, would have been sacrificed to the masters of sailing
vessels, or else all power, and not, as our system properly
provides, merely controlling power over the subject, lodged in
Congress.
Since this case, the Court has further receded from the doctrine once conceived to be established by the Wheeling Bridge
case, that a general declaration of Congress as to the free navigation of a public stream within the Federal jurisdiction,.prevented a State from bridging it or otherwise obstructing navi-
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gation. In a series of cases, commencing with EscanabaCo. v.
Chicago (1882), 107 U. S. 678, or perhaps with Poundv. Turck
(1887), 95 Id. 459, and ending with Wi/lamete Iron BrHdge
Co. v. Hatch (1887), 125 Id. i, the Court has defined such
phrases, as that a river shall be "a common highway and forever free," as referring not to physical obstructions, but to
political regulations tending to hamper the freedom of commerce. Such phrases were considered by the Court in Cardwell v. American Bridge Company (18 84), 113 U.S. 205, 212"As having but one object, namely, to insure a highway equally open to all,
without preference to any, and unobstructed Ly duties or tolls, mad thus prevent the
use of the navigable streams by private parties to the exclusion of the public, and
the exaction of any toll for their navigation," and " contemplated no other restriction upon the power of the State in authorizing the construction of bridges over
them, whenever such construction would promote the convenience of the public."

In Willamette i-on Bridge Co. v. Hatch, the Court formally
and finally abandoned all positions of the Wheeling Bridge"
case, tending to limit the control of the States over their highways by general declarations of Congress. It placed the
decision in that case, upon grounds peculiar to it. The proper
ground for the decision, was stated to be, that, the Court
having original jurisdiction in consequence of a State being
a party, and the plaintiff, by reason of its status, having the
right to invoke and the Court to apply any law applicable to
the case, State law, Federal law, or. international law, the
State of Pennsylvania was entitled by State and international
law, and not by general Federal legislation, to have the Ohio
River unobstructed by the bridge in question, until Congress
should definitely act by legalizing the structure, as it in fact
did. See 18 How. (59U. S.) 421.
Another important service the Supreme Court has rendered
to the States, is in the care with which, while giving due force
to the commerce power of Congress, it has maintained the
absolute supremacy of the States over their purely internal
affairs, free from Federal interference. The decisions in Wabash,
St. Louis and Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois (I886), 118
U. S.557, and Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Railway
Company (1887), 125 Id. 465, and in the many tax cases that
have come before the Court in recent years, wherein broad
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National doctrines have of necessity been expounded, must
not blind us to the fact that the Court, by its record, is as true
a conservator of the rights of the States, in itself abstaining, and
in requiring Congress to abstain, from interference with matters
purely of State cognizance, as in laying down wide limits of
State action in the absence of Congressional action. It has
established the exclusive control by the States over their nonnavigable streams, and their navigable streams above the points
where they are available for interstate traffic: Veazie v. Moor
(1852), i4 How. (55 U. S.) 568. It has declined to interfere
with State policies, as to interstate industries not strictly commercial in character, as in the cases establishing that the States
may determine upon what terms foreign insurance companies,
mining companies and the like may do business within their
borders: Paulv. Virginia (1868), 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 168; Ducat
v. Chicago (187o), IO Id. (77 U. S.) 410; Liverpool Insurance
Company v. Massachusetts (1870), Id. 566; Philadelphia Fire
Association v. New York (I886), 1i U. S. Iio; Pembina ConsolidatedMining Company v. Pennsylvania(1887), 125 Id. I81.
The absolute State jurisdiction over ferries, even at the boundaries of States, has been affirmed and reaffirmed: Fanningv.
Gregoire(1853),16 How. (57U. S.) 524, 534; Conwayv. Taylor
(i86i), I Black (66 U. S.) 603. The distinction between charges
for wharfage, and taxation upon commerce as such, is an important gain towards a clear marking of the lines of State
action: Packet Company v. Keokuk (1877), 95 U. S. 80; Packet
Company v. St. Louis (1879), 100 Id. 423; Packet Company v.
Catlettsburg(188),1o5 Id. 559.
State laws taxing the property of non-residents, where there
is no discrimination because of non-residence and no element
of a tax on interstate traffic as such is involved, have always
been sustained. Several interesting recent cases deserve to be
noticed. In Brown v. Houston, supra, p. 742, it was held that
coal, owned by citizens of Pennsylvania, but lying at the port of
New Orleans, and sent there for sale, was taxable as property at
that port, although, after arrival, it was sold in the boat without
being landed, and for the purpose of being taken out of the
country on a vessel bound for a foreign port So, in Coe v.
Errol(1885), 116 U.S. 517, logs lying at a shipping port in New
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Hampshire, designed for transportation to another State, but
not yet in transit, were held subject to taxation there.
The application by the Court in the Trade-Mark Cases (1879),
1oo U. S. 82, of the doctrine of the exclusion of Federal authority from regulating commerce purely internal in kind, was
perhaps a -surprise to some, but it was only in the line of the
earlier conservative decision in United States v. De Witt (i 869),
9 Wall. (76 U. S.) 41, where it was held that an Act of Congress regulating the vendible quality of illuminating oils was
not enforceable within State limits.
Much of the criticism that has been made upon the attitude
of the Court, charging it with a failure to apprehend the true
importance of the State governments as such, it will now be
seen, is somewhat unreflecting, at least so far as the law of the
commerce clause is concerned. That clause has been selected
by way of illustration, because, of all the powers in the National
grant, it is the one where we might least expect recognition of
State authority. There are, of course, a few still among us
who, with backward glance, like Justice DANIEL in his time,
fail to see in its full outline the Nation that was potentially
created when the Constitution was made, and which it has been
the high destiny of the Supreme Court of the United States to
disclose to the world. To these and such as these, whose
primary instinct is jealousy of National power, all power but
that of the States, is suggestive of usurpation, and the true
significance of the development of the Constitutional law of the
United States, whether in the line of expansion or of limitation,
is not to be shown. Happily, however, for the progress of
ideas, "that bald sexton Time" is fast gathering them to their
A. H. WINTERSTEEN.
fathers.
Philadelphia.

